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In a rapidly expanding academic literature on gratitude, psychologists, philosophers and 
educational theorists have argued that gratitude is not just of great psycho-social importance but 
also of moral significance. It would therefore seem to follow that the promotion of gratitude is 
also of moral educational significance. In this regard, recent attempts by psychologists to develop 
practical interventions designed to make people more grateful should be of some interest. 
However, while appreciating some benefits of such work, the present paper argues that much of it 
falls short of the educational task of developing an adequate pedagogy of gratitude focused on 
assisting learners’ acquaintance with the complex normative grammar (moral and conceptual) of 
gratitude discourse. With reference to ongoing work by the authors, the paper proceeds to explore 
further this important dimension of educating gratitude. 
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Gratitude and education 
As arguably a basic form of human association and reciprocation, gratitude has lately 
been subject to enormous attention from philosophers, psychologists and educational 
theorists who have sought to identify and/or demonstrate – empirically as well as 
conceptually – a wide range of personal, interpersonal and social benefits associated with 
the practice of expressing thanks for the favours or gifts of others, if not for good fortune 
in general, and even with simply experiencing feelings of gratitude (episodically or 
dispositionally).1 While such benefits, as we shall see, have often been conceived in the 
psychological or pro-social terms of mental health, well-being and/or amicable relations 
with others, it also seems commonly held by philosophers and social scientists alike that 
such benefits have a distinct moral dimension. From this viewpoint, perhaps the bulk of 
the philosophical literature has been preoccupied with certain key questions concerning 
the moral of status of gratitude – specifically with that of whether gratitude is best 
conceived as a duty (Berger, 1975) or as a virtue (Wellman, 1999).  But it is probably safe 
to say that psychologists have also routinely assumed that gratitude is a significant moral 
quality or capacity:  indeed, McCullough and colleagues (2001) have suggested that 
gratitude has three moral functions, firstly, as a moral barometer, whereby it gauges 
enhancement in one’s well-being in response to moral action; secondly as a moral 
motivator, whereby beneficiaries are motivated to help others; and thirdly, as a moral 
reinforcer whereby the prosocial actions of benefactors are re-affirmed (by receiving 
expressions of thanks from the beneficiary). 
That said, it is not the main concern of the present paper to defend further these 
ethical claims for gratitude, but rather to explore the educational or pedagogical 
implications of any such moral – duty- or virtue-based – conception of gratitude.  First, at 
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the very least, to take gratitude to be of moral concern is surely to conceive it as a quality 
or capacity that deserves cultivation for the individual or common good; to view gratitude 
as of moral significance might seem to commit us to the widespread educational or other 
cultivation or promotion of thanks giving – or, in short, to turning those around us 
(perhaps especially the young) into grateful or thankful people. However, taking it to be a 
moral commitment or virtue in the manner of other moral commitments or virtues (such 
as justice, honesty or generosity) would suggest that gratitude is also a rational or 
reasons-responsive capacity, requiring some instruction in the grammar of gratitude 
discourse, including some reflection or deliberation on the occasions on which gratitude 
is appropriate or required. For example, one might question the intentions of the 
benefactor; were these intentions benevolent? Was there an ulterior motive involved in 
the benefaction? Was the benefit valuable, or at least intended to be so? Did the 
benefactor act out of duty? and so forth. In this light, we argue in this paper that the 
cultivation of gratitude must involve careful reflection on questions such as these and be 
responsive to relevant reasons rather than indiscriminate; gratitude reflection or reasoning 
should, in turn, lead to appropriate attitudes of gratitude and suitable grateful behaviours 
and responses. 
 Whilst the received academic literature on gratitude – both psychological and 
philosophical – has had much of interest and importance to say about these questions, 
there is apparently some uncertainty or confusion over the general question of what it 
might mean to cultivate or develop gratitude – especially as a form of rational moral 
agency – as well as over the educational status of many of the approaches to promoting 
gratitude typically recommended.  In this regard, the present paper argues that – despite 




the development of interventions devoted to producing states of personal and pro-social 
well-being, has largely failed to address the key pedagogical issue of how we might most 
effectively assist young people (or others) to understand the normatively complex 
grammar of gratitude discourse. In the next section, we first examine what the 
psychological literature has had to say on these issues.      
 
Current attempts to teach or foster gratitude 
At this juncture, we might first ask here the fundamental question of why would we want 
to teach gratitude? To cut a long story short, an extensive psychological literature has 
suggested that experiencing gratitude has multiple benefits: for example, increases in 
subjective well-being and life satisfaction (Watkins, Woodward, Stone & Kolts, 2003; 
Wood, Joseph & Maltby, 2008); improvements in physical health (Emmons & 
McCullough, 2003); better interpersonal relationships (Algoe, 2012; Bartlett, 2012); and 
increases in pro-social behaviour (Barlett, 2006; Emmons & McCullough, 2003). One 
particularly interesting finding, specifically related to developing gratitude in school 
settings, is that gratitude has been found to increase adolescents’ level of satisfaction with 
school experience (Froh, Sefick & Emmons, 2008) and academic attainment (Froh, 
Emmons, Card, Bono & Wilson, 2011). Given the significant correlations between 
gratitude and positive psychological, social and emotional benefits that have been 
reported in recent years, it is not surprising that research has homed in on how feelings 
and experiences of gratitude can be increased. This is what we shall now focus upon. 
There are three gratitude exercises that frequently appear in the gratitude 
literature; counting blessings, gratitude journals and diaries, and gratitude visits. The 




you are grateful for, you shift awareness towards what you do have rather than do not 
have and begin to notice the positive things in your life or the people that benefit you. In 
the latter exercise, participants are asked to write and deliver a letter to someone to whom 
they were grateful but had never taken the opportunity to thank properly (thereby 
(re)inducing an experience of gratitude and prompting an expression of gratitude). These 
three particular exercises have been tested over various different time-frames and with 
different populations (presumably because they are relatively simple to administer and 
adhere to – especially the first two options).  
One of the best known studies of this kind comes from Emmons and McCullough 
(2003). In three studies, these researchers examined the effects of counting five blessings 
once a week for 10 weeks (Study 1), and listing grateful experiences once a day for 2 
weeks (Study 2) or 3 weeks (Study 3), and tested these exercises with both ‘normal’ 
populations (Studies 1 & 2) and individuals with neuromuscular diseases (Study 3). The 
results appear to demonstrate that engaging in gratitude exercises leads agents to entertain 
more positive appraisals of their lives in general; to increased optimism when thinking 
about the week ahead; to fewer physical complaints; to improved pro-social behaviours; 
to increases in positive affect; and to decreases in negative affect. Such results have also 
been indicated in subsequent studies, including those employing student samples (Froh et 
al., 2008; Froh, Kashdan, Ozimkowski, & Miller, 2009; Froh, Yurkewicz, & Kashdan, 
2009).  
Another technique that seems to enhance gratitude is ‘grateful reframing’. In 
essence, this refers to reframing a situation in a positive way. An example from the COPE 
scale (Carver, Scheier & Weintraub, 1989) is: ‘I try to see it in a different light, to make it 




developing gratitude; for example, Wood and colleagues (2007) highlighted positive 
reinterpretation as an adaptive coping style that is positively correlated with gratitude.  
Still, whilst many salient lessons may be learnt from these various interventions, 
we believe that they also raise some concerns; both conceptual and moral misgivings 
about current approaches are raised in the following sections. 
 
Motivation and Engagement: the focus on extrinsic benefits 
A major concern with such gratitude interventions surrounds participants’ and educators’ 
motivations to take part. That is, why are adult participants engaged in these programmes 
in the first place, and why do educators want younger participants to become engaged in 
them? Is the overall goal to increase levels of positive affect or well-being; to provide 
individuals with the skills to improve their social and personal relationships; or to help 
them acquire coping strategies, or to sleep better? 
What is the problem with this?, one might ask. On the face of it, there may seem 
to be nothing objectionable about such outcomes.  However, if gratitude is regarded as a 
moral virtue, then virtues should (according to virtue-ethical theories) be promoted for  
their intrinsic value to the end of flourishing life rather than for their instrumental value 
only; in other words, learners should come to conceive virtue as its own reward rather 
than as a mere means to some other end (Kristjánsson, 2013). So while  none of the 
aforementioned extrinsic ends of gratitude may seem damaging or harmful as such, they 
less clearly fit the bill as components of moral flourishing. Thus, it seems that the goal 
commonly adopted by gratitude researchers (see, for example, Seligman 2003, pp. 62–
75) is not to develop gratitude for its intrinsic worth, but rather to increase gratitude 




the attention away from the intrinsic worth of gratitude to such a radical extent that 
gratitude becomes, in principle, substitutable by any other psychological quality that 
produces the beneficial side-effects more effectively. 
A related problem with focusing only on instrumental benefits –   highlighted in 
the work of philosophers and psychologists alike – is the possibility that extrinsic 
motivations may actually have negative effects. Barry Schwartz (2014), for example, has 
cogently argued that extrinsic motivations (or ‘incentives’ as he calls them) ‘are the 
enemy of the motivation to do the right thing because it’s the right thing’. Schwartz 
points out that an extrinsic motivator (such as a monetary fine) can actually lead to 
decreased motivations to act morally rather than vice versa. 
Clearly, such claims present a warning to researchers and educationalists 
regarding the potential harms of purely promoting the instrumental benefits of gratitude. 
A focus on the intrinsic worth of gratitude may be in order if we are to avoid the potential 
negative effects of gratitude interventions.  
 
Gratitude as ‘positive’: an indiscriminate response? 
The observations above already suggest that gratitude interventions, without careful 
moral evaluation, could have a merely fortuitous, if not a negative, impact on 
participants. Indeed, one method of cultivating gratitude that might be particularly 
troublesome in this regard is positive reframing, which is not always appropriate and 
should be promoted with caution. Sometimes it may, in fact, be appropriate to focus in 
and reflect on negative affect or other negative outcomes of a situation. In this regard, 
promoting reframing as a way of enhancing gratitude or other positive emotions may well 




appropriately reasoned, response. If we take an Aristotelian perspective on virtue, 
gratitude would only count as appropriate when felt ‘at the right times, about the right 
things, towards the right people, for the right end and in the right way’ (Aristotle, 1985, p. 
44 [1106b17–35]). In order to experience gratitude as and when required, careful 
deliberation (or the exercise of practical wisdom) concerning the occasions of its use is 
needed. Such reflection requires weighing up which particular situations call for gratitude 
and which do not. For instance, should we be grateful to benefactors acting out of self-
interest or reserve our gratitude for more benevolent acts? Should we be grateful to 
individuals who are fulfilling the requirements of their job or only those who perform 
supererogatory acts (that go above and beyond the call of duty)? Thus, forced reframing 
may cloud an individual’s judgement about when and where gratitude should be 
experienced and/or expressed. 
Positive reframing has been suggested as a way of regulating negative emotions 
(Froh & Bono, 2014; Watkins, 2013) which, when used appropriately, may well help 
individuals to navigate adverse situations. Clearly, however, as already suggested, there is 
a limit to the usefulness of this strategy; for always ignoring negative affect, or constantly 
reframing negative outcomes as positive ones, may well be unwise and unhelpful. Insofar 
as life inevitably has light and shade, it is surely important that we are able to experience 
both positive and negative emotions; for how else will we learn to cope with negative 
events? Relatedly, how might we foster such virtues as compassion if we are unable to 
appreciate the problems and negative affect of others? One author who offers an eloquent 
perspective on the mixed psychological economy of positive and negative emotions is 
Giovanna Colombetti (2005). She suggests that a common problem arising from a focus 




emotions are thought to entail positive (or negative) aspects. However, Colombetti 
suggests that feelings or emotions such as relief and contentment are not necessarily 
either good or bad. This is precisely how the present authors are inclined to regard 
gratitude. While it may be easier to conceive our emotional responses to situations as 
purely positive or negative, it seems that most of the time our feelings are mixed. As 
Colombetti argues, ‘the take-away message is that an emotion and specific behaviours, 
feelings, etc. need not [go] together because they all have the same ‘valence sign’’ 
(p.115); ‘a different view would allow true phenomenological mixtures, as in a sweet-
and-sour flavour. [ ] I do not really seem to be able to pay attention to the sourness in 
isolation from the sweetness, and vice versa. Perhaps mixed feelings are sweet-and-sour-
like’ (pp. 116 – 117). 
So even if it is appropriate to conceive gratitude as a wholly positive emotion in 
terms of valence/affect, it would not follow that it should be promoted indiscriminately to 
the exclusion of negatively valenced emotions. However, there is another conceptual 
issue here that seems largely ignored in the current gratitude literature: this is that 
gratitude is often not deemed to be wholly pleasant, and that gratitude experience does 
not necessarily lead to positive affect.  
Conceptually (and empirically)2 gratitude often seems to imply or entail 
obligation. So while, as Claudia Card has remarked, ‘a duty of gratitude sounds like a 
joke’, it is difficult, if not sometimes impossible, not to feel some obligation to respond 
gratefully to the favours or gifts of benefactors, and such obligations may be experienced 
as burdensome rather than pleasant. In this regard, philosopher Terry McConnell (1993) 
regards gratitude as a kind of ‘moral obligation’. On the other hand, such theorists as 




the spirit of genuine gratitude: thus, in the words of Roberts, ‘many people do, of course, 
feel a compulsion to pay off their generous benefactors, but to do so is not to exemplify 
gratitude, but instead something like a (misapplied) virtue of justice’ (2007, p. 8). All the 
same, it seems that some connection between gratitude and experience of obligation is a 
common experience. Indeed, our own prototype analysis of gratitude (Morgan, Gulliford 
& Kristjánsson, 2014) revealed that obligation was frequently named as a characteristic 
that is typical of instances of gratitude (see Table 1 of Morgan et al., 2014). Such 
association seems indicative of a deep connection between gratitude and at least the idea 
of something owed by virtue of benefits bestowed or services rendered3.  
By the same token, it is difficult to divorce gratitude entirely from a second 
negatively perceived construct or source of affect: that of indebtedness. Once again, our 
recent prototype analysis of gratitude in the UK revealed that a sense of indebtedness was 
frequently named as a feature of gratitude. That said, while this does suggest that these 
two concepts are commonly associated, other researchers, for instance Watkins and 
colleagues, have nevertheless argued that gratitude should be kept separate from negative 
concepts such as indebtedness (Watkins, 2013; Watkins, Sheer, Ovnicek & Kolts 2006). 
But, even if one accepts that gratitude and indebtedness are different constructs that feel 
different and have different implications for action (Watkins et al., 2006), some basic 
conceptual connection between gratitude and indebtedness seems hardly deniable. From 
this viewpoint, it is unsurprising that feelings of grateful appreciation and indebtedness 
are liable to arise simultaneously on occasions of favour or benefit. Indeed, such 
correlations between these two constructs have been reported in gratitude studies (e.g., 
Tesser, Gatewood & Driver, 1968; Watkins et al., 2006). Moreover, a recent investigation 




occurrence of feelings of grateful appreciation and indebtedness (Gulliford, Morgan & 
Kristjánsson, forthcoming). Using vignettes, the researchers asked participants to imagine 
a situation wherein a colleague nominates them for an award. They were further asked to 
imagine that they feel indebted to this colleague. Following this, these participants were 
asked whether they feel grateful to the colleague (answered on a 5-point Likert scale 
from strongly disagree to strongly agree), and about the extent of the gratitude that they 
feel (from 0 = not at all grateful to 100 = most grateful you could feel). Responses 
revealed that participants were likely to feel grateful to the colleague regardless of also 
feeling indebted (71% of 420 participants agree/strongly agree that they would feel 
grateful). However, interestingly, when comparing the degree of gratitude experienced 
(out of 100) to a situation in which only gratitude was experienced and no indebtedness, 
the degree of reported gratitude decreased significantly (61/100 gratitude and 
indebtedness; 68/100 gratitude only (difference significant at the level of .001)). This 
finding therefore suggests that while gratitude may co-occur with feelings of 
indebtedness, feelings of indebtedness may impact upon the degree of gratitude that is 
felt. This seems to offer more fine-grained evidence that these two constructs are 
connected. 
Such relationships between gratitude and indebtedness or obligation have clear 
and important implications for gratitude interventions and/or education. Firstly, given that 
gratitude and indebtedness or obligation are likely, at least sometimes, to coincide, should 
we be educating students about gratitude without some reference to indebtedness and 
obligation? Indeed, how might one even begin to explain all the conceptual dimensions of 
gratitude without some understanding of social norms of reciprocation that are clearly 




Further to this, if indebtedness and/or obligation involve negative or 
uncomfortable feelings, and if advocates of gratitude interventions remain insistent that 
gratitude is entirely and always positive, this could well have confusing and potentially 
damaging effects on the subjects of such interventions. Instead, it would seem wiser to 
acknowledge that gratitude may be accompanied by negative emotions (including, but not 
limited, to indebtedness and obligation – since other examples of negative emotions 
associated with gratitude could include guilt, awkwardness and embarrassment; see 
Morgan et al., 2014). Indeed, such concession might allow space for the exploration of a 
range of other gratitude related emotions, and perhaps for illuminating reflection on why 
in some situations we fail to feel grateful.  
 
When is gratitude ‘appropriate’? Further moral and conceptual complexities 
That gratitude should not be promoted indiscriminately is supported by philosopher 
Claudia Card. In a recent video presentation on ‘reflections on gratitude’, Card 
distinguishes between ‘appropriate and inappropriate gratitude, observing that: ‘my focus 
in not about what is good about gratitude but on that distinction: When is gratitude 
appropriate? When is it not?’ She goes on to state how she is ‘sceptical of promoting 
gratitude as an orientation toward life,’ ‘an indiscriminate approach [ ] can be self-
destructive’. In agreement with this, the present authors argue that rather than uncritically 
fostering gratitude programmes or interventions, teachers and other educators should be 
encouraging discussion and reflection on what gratitude is and when it is appropriate.  
In this light, the crucial question, from a pedagogical point of view, is whether it 
is the business of educators to ‘make children more grateful’ rather than teach them about 




gratitude interventions. For instance, one school-based curriculum teaches children to 
‘think gratefully’ by fostering gratitude-inducing socio-cognitive appraisals with regard to 
receiving benefits (Froh, et al., 2014). In this programme, young people (aged 8 – 11 
years) are encouraged to reflect on the personal value of a benefit received, and on a 
benefactor’s intentions and the cost to her or him of the benefit. The goal of this 
curriculum appears to be that of educating students to recognise the circumstances of 
gratitude and the reasons why one might feel grateful. However, while one may 
appreciate how contemplating such judgements could increase gratitude and thus ‘tune[s] 
individuals into seeing the best in other people’ (Froh and Bono, 2014, p. 194),  this 
particular curriculum rather assumes that benefactors’ motives are benign and that 
apparently benevolent acts are always free from more dubious motives such as self-
interest or ingratiation. That is, programmes such as these may teach students to look 
exclusively for the positive (e.g., positive intentions and positive affect) and as a result 
blind them to the negative. In short, the focus of such educational interventions still 
appears to be more upon appreciation of the reasons for gratitude than on more critical 
understanding of when or where gratitude may be appropriate. While one might say that 
by learning the former one automatically learns the latter, the danger remains that the 
predominantly positive emphasis of such social-cognitive skills still errs on the side of 
uncritical or undiscriminating appraisal of gratitude as an unmixed good – especially if 
such positive appraisal is associated with enhanced positive affect. Indeed, Froh and 
colleagues (2014, p. 143) found that students in their intervention gained 0.019 units of 
positive affect each week, whereas the control group stayed relatively flat – which also 
led to significant differences in mean levels of positive affect 12 and 20 weeks later.  




generate or improve positive affect, since this has the potentially dangerous consequence 
of disabling agents’ critical appreciation of the true nature – for good or ill – of any 
apparent benefaction. Rather, the educational goal should be to enable positive appraisals 
only when they are justified, and for individuals to feel equally justified in giving 
situations negative appraisals in cases of ‘bogus benefaction’.  
Thus, in the present view, children and young people should be taught to reflect 
on gratitude with much greater discernment than the educational interventions of Froh 
and colleagues seem to allow. In consequence, we would argue that the primary 
educational task should not be the prescriptive task of making children more 
‘indiscriminately’ grateful, but of stimulating reflection on understanding the grammar 
and meaning of gratitude and its appropriateness in a given situation. Such proper 
understanding of gratitude should precede any attempt to form grateful agents as such.  
To take a parallel case, it would seem morally indefensible to teach children to be 
indiscriminately forgiving – even if, say, it were shown that it is better for their mental 
health – without teaching them about when and where forgiveness is or is not 
appropriate.  In this regard, positive interventions devoted to making children and young 
people more grateful or forgiving court the danger of blinding them to the less welcome 
realities of human moral and other association and of therefore exposing them to the risk 
of exploitation or manipulation. Thus, while we do not object in principle to the idea of 
helping people to be more genuinely grateful, we believe that this cannot be properly 
accomplished without attention to the necessary discriminative capacities that such 
genuine gratitude would involve. 
 




Understandings of gratitude can be, and inevitably are, complex. It is, therefore, 
important to encourage exploration of the concept without predetermining its meaning or 
importance. In support of this, Kerry Howells, a teacher educator who has researched the 
educational significance of gratitude, has noted in her 2012 book on the topic that she: 
‘had previously believed that gratitude was something that could be clearly defined in a 
way that everyone could, and should understand’ (p. 24). However after attending a 
primary school workshop she found she ‘was no longer able to take refuge in (Henry) 
Sidgewick’s notion of gratitude as a “truly universal intuition”’ (p.25).  
 The complexity in experience and understanding of gratitude is particularly 
apparent when looking to the dyadic/triadic distinction of gratitude (see, for some recent 
discussion of this distinction, Carr 2013; Gulliford, Morgan & Kristjánsson, 2013; 
Lambert, Graham, & Fincham, 2009). Triadic gratitude, as the name suggests, is a three 
place relation involving a beneficiary, a benefit, and a benefactor. This type of gratitude is 
most commonly referred to in the literature, with the majority of accounts incorporating 
these three components. Dyadic gratitude (also known as ‘generalised gratitude’; 
Lambert et al., 2009), on the other hand, has only two components – a benefit and 
beneficiary – and, in this case, there is no specific benefactor involved to direct gratitude 
towards. Examples of the dyadic form might be experiencing gratitude towards nature, or 
feeling grateful for one’s situation at a particular time. Indeed, while some theorists, such 
as philosopher Patrick Boleyn-Fitzgerald, have suggested that one can just be grateful 
full-stop without attributing such gratitude to anyone in particular, others view gratitude 
as always involving a triadic form and would instead regard dyadic gratitude as a more 
general form of appreciation (Adler & Fagley, 2005). Similarly, whilst some individuals 




the thought that counts. Some people may be grateful to individuals who are simply 
fulfilling the requirements of their job (for example, feeling grateful to a cashier, a 
teacher, or a lifeguard), other may reserve gratitude for those who are going above and 
beyond the call of duty (i.e., in a supererogatory acts). Sensitivity to such complexities in 
the conceptualisation of gratitude should be borne in mind when promoting or teaching 
about gratitude as this is likely to have an impact on students’ understandings and 
experiences of gratitude.  
Another rather different though not unrelated issue pertains to the diversity of 
gratitude constructs. For example an important point to bear in mind when educating on 
gratitude may be the particular culture in which gratitude is being explored. Research by 
some present authors has demonstrated that ideas about gratitude do seem to differ from 
one culture to another. In a prototype analysis of gratitude – the first stage of which asked 
participants to name all of the features and characteristics that they take to be typical of 
instances of gratitude (see Morgan et al., 2014) – the UK findings were compared with 
those from a US sample (Lambert et al., 2009). This comparison demonstrated a variety 
of differences between the two samples; for example, a greater number of negatively 
valenced features of gratitude were pinpointed by participants in the UK. Examples of 
such UK associations included experiences of indebtedness, obligation, guilt, 
embarrassment and awkwardness in relation to perceived benefaction. Such discrepancy 
between these two samples suggests that while conceptualisations of gratitude may 
overlap across cultures, they are by no means identical. Thus, while we have previously 
suggested that gratitude might have a common core shared across different cultures – in 
addition to certain socially constructed elements that are specific to one particular culture 




differences between two well-developed Western cultures. However, it may be that the 
differences between Western and Eastern cultures are even more marked.  
Indeed, Appadurai’s (1985) research seems to be a case in point. This researcher 
demonstrated that expressions of gratitude and the task of identifying precisely when one 
should be grateful are rather complex in Tamil culture – where higher status individuals 
have a responsibility to provide for those of lower status – than in other cultures. This 
means that individuals in this culture may find it hard to distinguish benefits bestowed 
voluntarily from those bestowed out of a sense of duty. It also raises the question of 
whether the beneficiary feels as grateful to those of higher status from whom benefits are 
expected. Appadurai also indicates that Tamil gratitude focuses more on the benefits of 
benefaction than on the benefactor (see also Cohen, 2006) – which might suggest a 
different relationship between beneficiary and benefactor than is common in Western 
cultures.  
 
Future recommendations for the teaching of gratitude 
Nothing we have said so far denies that an educational focus on gratitude can have a 
beneficial effect on both students and teachers (Chan et al., 2010; Froh et al., 2008). Our 
argument has been more that care must be taken when designing and delivering 
programmes dedicated to educational appreciation of the normative and moral 
complexities of gratitude. More specifically, we have argued that learning gratitude 
should involve exploration of: issues of moral motivation (for example, the difference 
between intrinsic and extrinsic motivations of the beneficiary); issues concerning the 
conceptual nature of gratitude (for example, its relationship to obligation and 




example, concerning the ‘tailoring’ of gratitude to allow for diverse cultural 
understandings).   
As already indicated, two of the present authors have been conducting an in-depth 
examination of how gratitude is understood in the UK. Our approach has been to examine 
gratitude both theoretically and empirically, combining an interdisciplinary literature 
review of the concept of gratitude in philosophy and psychology (see Gulliford et al., 
2013) with an empirical attempt to elucidate the conceptual contours of gratitude from a 
lay perspective. We believe it is important to try to determine whether, and to what 
degree, the conceptual controversies about gratitude evident in the academic literature 
actually reflect or inform peoples’ (including students’) understanding of the concept. In 
this regard, it is at least arguable that much existing empirical and theoretical work has 
superimposed, explicitly or implicitly, certain assumptions about the meaning of gratitude 
onto research – and this also applies to the practical gratitude interventions under scrutiny 
in this paper. We have endeavoured to discover lay concepts of gratitude, including those 
of children, in order to bring together such views with those of philosophers and 
psychologists. 
At all events, gratitude is clearly a complex concept with many contested features. 
Take, for example, the aforementioned considerations of intentions of, and cost to, the 
benefactor, or deliberations on duty and value. Whilst we cannot describe all of the 
complexities that are involved in the normative grammar of gratitude here, we might 
direct you to one of our previous papers for an in depth discussion on this topic (Gulliford 
et al., 2013). 
The controversies about gratitude that we have here and elsewhere highlighted 




authors) into four story workbooks for children aged 8-11. These workbooks explore 
various situations wherein gratitude may or may not be experienced depending on the 
individuals’ own conception of gratitude. Benefactors in these stories exhibit a range of 
motives for giving (some benevolent, some not so) and vary in the degree of effort and/or 
cost they incur in bestowing the benefit. Children are also encouraged to reflect on 
benefits that are deemed either valuable or of little to no value, and as desired or 
unwanted. There is also space in the workbooks for children to answer questions that 
more deeply probe their understanding of gratitude. Some questions invite open 
responses while others take a Likert format to explore the amount of gratitude children 
believe that different characters in a story might feel in situations of potential benefactor 
manipulation. The issues raised in such explorations focus on questions of gratitude and 
duty, benefactor intention and effort, the value of the benefit, and of whether a benefit 
must materialise. The workbooks have also attempted to probe children’s understanding 
of triadic (interpersonal) and dyadic (generalised) gratitude. The findings from this 
gratitude research will be published separately. The important point for now, however, is 
that these stories – designed primarily to examine children’s beliefs about factors that 
influence gratitude – are also clearly employable as teaching resources to promote 
classroom exploration of what it means to understand gratitude. In short, there is a surely 
a good educational case for helping young people to appreciate the complex grammar of 
gratitude discourse, irrespective of whether this may make them more grateful. As 
described, the gratitude stories examine various motives for benefaction that might serve 
as a basis on which to stimulate reflective class discussion about appropriate gratitude. 
While ‘gratitude recognitions’ have been shown to amplify gratefulness and 




not be formulated in a more nuanced and reflective way and embedded within an 
educational programme in which exploration of the moral and conceptual grammar of 
gratitude – as well as its ‘shadow side’ (manipulation, coercion and power dynamics) – 
might be conducted in an age-appropriate way. For, as we have seen, a number of 
philosophers have been particularly concerned to emphasise that gratitude is not as 
inherently positive as some psychologists have supposed. 
Indeed, within the framework of Aristotelian virtue ethics, moral responses may 
be considered virtuous only insofar as they are directed towards the right person, to the 
right degree, at the right time, for the right purpose and in the right way. While it is 
contested whether gratitude was regarded as a virtue by Aristotle himself, it may yet be 
possible to give a useful virtue ethical account of it along these Aristotelian lines 
(Kristjánsson, 2013). As noted, however, the account given of gratitude by many 
psychologists and educators – as an unambiguous and unproblematic quality – is at odds 
with any such virtuous gratitude in neglecting to consider whether gratitude is appropriate 
in a given situation: on the Aristotelian view, gratitude would be being discriminatingly 
grateful to the right person, for the right reason and to the right degree. 
Thus, notwithstanding that gratitude may often feel good, or may be shown to 
have beneficial effects for personal wellbeing, it is educationally crucial to teach children 
to be able to assess gratitude critically and to be alert to instances of potentially non-
virtuous gratitude. For example, in one of the stories developed by present authors, a 
child nominates a classmate for a school award, only to ask subsequently whether she can 
copy the nominee’s answers in an upcoming spelling test.  Similarly dubious motives 
shape the intentions of a character in ‘The Class Councillor’ in which a shy boy is 




classmate whose motive is malicious, insofar as he wants to embarrass the boy and see 
him make a fool of himself. These and other stories offer opportunities for discussion of 
whether gratitude is always appropriate and explore situations in which children might 
easily find themselves.  
This issue about the intricacies of ascertaining whether gratitude is always 
virtuous is not limited to childhood. Robert C. Roberts (2013) has drawn attention to the 
ways in which gratitude and generosity can take less than fully virtuous shapes in his 
examination of the checkered pathologies of gratitude and generosity in Dickens’ Bleak 
House. Discerning what it means to manifest a virtue such as gratitude must involve and 
engage practical wisdom with regard to its complexities. It is just this concern with 
stimulating reflection, sensitivity and judgement about what such virtues as gratitude are, 
and about the appropriate contexts of their exercise, that should occupy educators more 
than any promotion of gratitude (or of hope or forgiveness, for that matter) as salutary 
character strengths that bring a variety of putative benefits. 
 
Concluding Remarks 
This paper has argued that many previous gratitude interventions seem to have had the 
relatively narrow aim of setting out to make young people more grateful. By contrast, we 
have argued that more appropriate and morally acceptable educational gratitude 
interventions should be pursued in the context of stimulating children’s understanding of 
what gratitude means, and of reflecting on when or where it is appropriate. Whilst this 
might well lead to the same instrumental benefits that are claimed in the positive 
psychology literature, it would also allow students to appreciate the ‘grammar’ of 
gratitude.. We have also argued that this educational task may be well assisted by 




key feature of basic human association. One promising route to this might be to use 
stories – drawn from literature or real life – that concern key gratitude themes. Failing 
this, encouraging or compelling children to become more grateful without providing a 
space for them to learn what gratitude is, or being equipped to recognise instances of 
inappropriate gratitude, may seem to put the cart before the horse.  
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Authors’ Notes 
                                                 
1 We view gratitude in terms of a multi-component model which incorporates feelings of gratitude (an 
emotion component); attitudes/beliefs about the concept (attitude component); and gratitude-related 
behaviours (behaviour component). These three components (which are also linked to a fourth conceptual 
component) are particularly relevant to the arguments we present in this paper. Therefore, within the 
following sections we draw upon issues that relate to gratitude as an emotion; gratitude as an attitude; and 
gratitude behaviour. 
2 In this paper, we refer to ‘conceptual’ links between gratitude and obligation/ indebtedness as pertaining 
to meaning or understanding of the constructs; whilst ‘empirical’ links refer to those that are tested through 
practical or experimental techniques. 
3 Whilst we make the argument here that gratitude might coincide with a perceived obligation to return 
gifts or favours, it is important to note that we do not view gratitude as merely equivalent to reciprocation. 
The connection between gratitude and the obligation to reciprocate that has been noted in our own research 
has likely arisen because both are appropriate responses to being benefitted. However, gratitude is not equal 
to, nor does is necessitate, the desire to pay back benefits received. Similarly, obligation may be viewed as 
a duty to feel or express (rather than pay back) gratitude (Berger, 1975) or could involve no source of 





                                                                                                                                                 
 
